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Depression is associated with significant difficulty staying “in the moment” as the mind
tends to wander away from current activity to focus instead on personal concerns.
Mind-wandering (MW) may in some instances be a precursor for depressive rumination,
a thinking style believed to confer vulnerability to the likelihood and extent of depression.
Thus, MW may be not only a consequence but also a cause of low mood. Identifying
a paradigm that could modulate MW, particularly in depressed individuals, would allow
future studies to test whether elevated rates of MW causally drive cognitive-affective
features of depression, such as rumination and anhedonia. This study therefore explored
the feasibility of using an existing task manipulation to modulate behavioral and self-
report indices of MW in participants with varying levels of self-reported dysphoria.
Participants completed two go/no-go tasks—the SART and a high target probability task—
and measures of state and trait MW. The two tasks were identical in all respects
apart from the lower probability of no-go targets on the SART, a feature considered to
encourage mindless, or inattentive, responding. Across participants, errors of commission
(a behavioral indicator of MW) were elevated on the SART relative to the high probability
task, a pattern that was particularly pronounced in dysphoric participants. Dysphoric
individuals furthermore reported elevated levels of MW, though the modulation of these
subjective reports by task was present to a similar rather than greater extent in the
dysphoric individuals. These findings provide encouraging preliminary support for the use
of this paradigm as one that modulates MW in depressed individuals. The implications of
these results and directions for future research are discussed.
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INTRODUCTION
Much research into cognitive processing in depression has
focused on depressive rumination, a thinking style believed to
confer vulnerability to depressive episodes and to exacerbate
the course of depression (Nolen-Hoeksema and Morrow, 1993;
Nolen-Hoeksema et al., 1993; Nolen-Hoeksema, 2000). The term
rumination refers to a response style that is characterized by a per-
sistent and repetitive focus on thoughts about the causes, mean-
ings, and consequences of one’s low mood (Nolen-Hoeksema,
1991). While much research has been devoted to the conse-
quences of depressive rumination, there has been little consid-
eration of the factors that may make rumination more likely.
Given that attention has a limited capacity, embarking upon
ruminative trains of thought, for example, must often entail dis-
engagement of attention from the here-and-now toward what is
often personally-relevant and negative material.
This process of disengaging from the present has been explored
in different contexts and described by a number of overlap-
ping terms. These include mind-wandering (MW) (Smallwood
and Schooler, 2006), stimulus-independent thought (Teasdale
et al., 1995), task-unrelated thought (TUT) (Smallwood et al.,
2009), absent-mindedness (Robertson et al., 1997; Cheyne et al.,
2006), and daydreaming (Klinger, 1990). This work has tended
to focus on MW’s adverse effects upon performance and cog-
nition, in both laboratory and real-life settings. For example,
MW has been associated with impaired comprehension during
reading (e.g., Smallwood et al., 2008). However, it has been sug-
gested that MW has an additional important functional role.
This has been borne out in experimental studies showing that
MW facilitates specific cognitive functions such as future plan-
ning and problem-solving (see Mooneyham and Schooler, 2013,
for a review).
There is accumulating evidence for an association between
MW and depressed or dysphoric mood. In an early study
(Giambra and Traynor, 1978), subjective reports of daydreaming,
or MW, were found to correlate with three measures of depres-
sion in depressed individuals. In another study of participants
with a diagnosis of depression, lapses of attention in everyday
life and in a laboratory-based reading test were closely related
and typically due to MW, rather than to “blanking” or external
distraction (Watts and Sharrock, 1985). A series of recent corre-
lational studies furthermore demonstrated that the frequency of
self-reported MW in everyday life is associated with higher levels
of self-reported depression and state negative affect (Stawarczyk
et al., 2012). Other studies have also reported links between
dysphoric mood and MW (e.g., Smallwood et al., 2005, 2007).
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However, few studies have addressed causality in this relation-
ship. A notable exception is a study by Smallwood et al. (2009) in
which negative and positive mood were induced in the laboratory.
Their findings demonstrated that relative to positive mood, nega-
tive mood resulted in an increase in the frequency of self-reported
task-irrelevant thoughts and also more errors on what is often
considered to be a behavioral index of MW derived from a lab-
oratory test of sustained attention, the Sustained Attention to
Response Task (SART).
In line with the role ascribed to depressive rumination above,
there is emerging interest in the idea that MW and related pro-
cesses are not only a consequence of, but also causal in the
development and maintenance of low mood. An experience sam-
pling study conducted in ∼5000 unselected individuals across
83 countries linked MW to reduced levels of happiness during
everyday life (Killingsworth and Gilbert, 2010). Whilst this asso-
ciation may have reflected an influence of momentary low mood
on MW (e.g., via ruminative content) or alternatively, an influ-
ence of some other common factor (e.g., poor cognitive control)
on both mood and MW, time-lag analyses suggested that, MW
was the cause, and not merely the consequence, of low mood. It
is worth noting that the Killingsworth and Gilbert study focused
on the association between MW and state, rather than longer
term trait, moods. Stawarczyk et al. (2013) have provided further
evidence for the involvement of MW in maintaining state neg-
ative mood over time. In their study, induced anticipation of a
negative event, relative to a neutral one, predicted MW episodes
specifically related to induced concern, and this in turn predicted
subsequent levels of momentary negative affect.
In conceptual terms, MW can be contrasted with “mindful-
ness.” Mindfulness is a form of cognitive stance characterized by
“paying attention in a particular way: on purpose, in the present
moment, and nonjudgmentally” (Kabat-Zinn, 1994). An exam-
ple includes being able to maintain focus on the coming or going
of one’s breath, noting but having the ability to move on dispas-
sionately from the occurrence of distressing thoughts. Another
example includes being able to engage in a current task such
that the task, rather than self-conscious reflection, dominates the
mental landscape. The supposed benefits of practice in mindful-
ness have led to its adoption in some forms of cognitive therapy
for depression, such as mindfulness-based cognitive therapy, or
MBCT (Segal et al., 2002; Piet and Hougaard, 2011). Though
the precise mechanisms of action of mindfulness remain poorly
understood, MW and particular elements of mindfulness—such
as paying attention in the present moment—can be considered
opposing constructs. Mrazek et al. (2012) demonstrated nega-
tive correlations between a measure of dispositional mindfulness
and four measures of MW. They also showed a reduction in MW
on a test of sustained attention immediately following 8min of
mindful breathing, relative to either reading or passive relaxation.
Thus, there is increasing clinical interest in the idea that
altered mood in depression may be maintained, at least in part,
by difficulties keeping “in the moment” and that interventions
that reduce, or enhance control over, MW could have a bene-
ficial effect upon mood in depression. Finding ways to reduce
MW, however, requires a better understanding of the factors that
influence the likelihood that the mind will wander.
Basic research in healthy populations has identified disposi-
tional and situational factors that influence the prevalence and
extent of MW. For instance, levels of MW are higher in younger
relative to older individuals (Jackson and Balota, 2012) and in
those with a lower working memory capacity (McVay and Kane,
2009, 2011). Individuals also demonstrate more MW at slower
stimulus presentation rates (Smallwood et al., 2004) and as a
task becomes more familiar over longer task durations (Manly
et al., 1999; Smallwood et al., 2003, 2004; McVay and Kane,
2009). These experimental manipulations have been only mini-
mally applied in individuals experiencing depressed or lowmood,
and thus, whether these manipulations have similar effects in
these individuals remains unknown.
Identifying a method that reliably influences rates of MW in
depressed individuals could be of significant value in the mood
and MW literature, particularly as existing evidence for a link
between mood and MW is largely associative and correlational. A
paradigm that modulates MW, particularly in depressed individ-
uals, would allow experimental control over a process considered
important in the development and maintenance of depressed
mood. Such an approach would make it possible to test whether
elevated rates of MW causally drive cognitive-affective features
that are central to depression, such as rumination or anhedonia.
The current study thus aimed to determine whether a lab-
oratory manipulation considered to encourage an automatic
and “mindless” mode of responding to differing extents influ-
ences behavioral and self-report measures of MW, particularly
in individuals experiencing naturally-occurring dysphoric mood.
Individuals that varied in the degree to which they reported
experiencing symptoms of depression, indexed via the Beck
Depression Inventory (BDI-II) (Beck et al., 1996), completed two
different versions of a go/no-go task that differed in the proba-
bility of no-go targets, a design feature that in addition to the
continuous performance element has been argued to determine
the duration over which participants must maintain active atten-
tion (Manly et al., 1999). Immediately following performance
of each task, retrospective self-report measures of MW were
administered so that the correspondence between behavioral and
self-report measures of MW could be examined. These included
a thought content scale that has been used previously to index the
subjective experience of TUT and task-related interference (TRI)
(e.g., Smallwood et al., 2004), along with scales intended to index
the experience of MW to positive or negative themes.
One of the tasks was the SART, performance on which has been
shown to correlate significantly with reports of everyday cognitive
failures, or absendmindedness, in individuals who have sustained
a traumatic brain injury (Robertson et al., 1997). In the SART,
participants are presented with a regular, rhythmic sequence
of single digits and are asked to make the same, single-button
response to each with the exception of a nominated, infrequent
(11%) no-go target (e.g., “3”). To avoid errors on the no-go
trials, participants must maintain active attentive control over
responding in order to resist the tendency to press to every digit
(Manly, 1999; Smallwood et al., 2004; Smallwood and Schooler,
2006). It has been argued that the repetitive, relatively unselective,
and frequent response can become rapidly automated, allowing
participants to devote attentional resources to activities other
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than those exclusively focused on task completion, such as TUT
or MW. The other task was a modified response withholding
task in which participants are required to withhold a response
to targets on a much higher proportion (50%) of no-go trials.
Previous work has demonstrated that the SART discriminates
between individuals that differ in the extent of everyday self-
reported absentmindedness indexed via the Cognitive Failures
Questionnaire (CFQ; Broadbent et al., 1982) whereas the high
probability task does not (Manly et al., 1999). Inclusion of the
modified response withholding task allows determination of
whether any observed impairments are due to the requirement to
maintain attentive control over responses or to more general fea-
tures of the task, such as the requirement for inhibitory control.
Responses on no-go trials on the SART, that is, errors of com-
mission, reflect, at least in part, the efficiency of this strategy,
relating to questionnaire measures of absentmindedness andMW
(Robertson et al., 1997; Manly et al., 1999; Smallwood et al., 2004;
Smallwood and Schooler, 2006). A second key performance index
is variability in response times (RTs) during the task. At either
extreme of a theoretical performance distribution it might be
expected that variation in RTs would be relatively small; a par-
ticipant who responds to all trials in an inattentive manner may
well do so entrained to the rhythmic presentation of the digits
and show little variability. A participant who carefully scrutinizes
each digit to establish whether a response is required may also
show remarkably consistent reaction times. In contrast, a par-
ticipant who lapses between periods of careful attention and of
“absentminded” response production in which their mind is else-
where is likely to showmuch greater variability overall. Consistent
with this analysis, it has been suggested that the RT coefficient of
variability (CV) may reflect subtle differences in RT that are due
to lapses of attention, thus providing a good index of MW (e.g.,
McVay and Kane, 2009; Seli et al., 2012).
The SART has been employed as a behavioral proxy of MW as
performance on this task has been shown to correlate with online
and retrospective self-report measures of MW (Smallwood et al.,
2004; Marchetti et al., 2012). Consistent with the elevated levels
of subjectively-experiencedMWassociated with depression, there
have been reports of performance difficulties on the SART in clin-
ically depressed or dysphoric individuals. For instance, a study
of UK military personnel found increased numbers of commis-
sion errors in depressed individuals (Farrin et al., 2003). However,
the increase in commission errors associated with depression has
rarely been linked to subjective indices of MW. Smallwood et al.
(2004) collected performance data and measures of subjective
MW on the SART, along with depression symptomatology, but
the relationships between these indices and depression severity
were not discussed. Stawarczyk et al. (2012) reported an asso-
ciation between increasing depression severity and reports of
everydayMW (i.e., daydreaming) and also between everydayMW
and MW during the SART but did not report SART errors or
RTCV. The relationship between SART commission errors and
subjective MW was recently indexed using intermittent thought
probes in 23 students that varied on the BDI (Deng et al., 2012).
Depression severity correlated negatively with subjective reports
of being “on-task” and positively with reports of both MW
without awareness and dispositional mindfulness, but not with
SART commission errors. Considering these studies together,
in individuals experiencing low mood, the relationship between
behavioral and self-report measures of MW on the SART remains
unclear.
Understanding the relationship between behavioral and self-
report measures of MW and the conditions that modulate the
extent to which the mind wanders in dysphoric individuals is
important from both theoretical and clinical perspectives. With
this in mind, the current study was implemented primarily to
explore the feasibility of modulating MW, particularly in dys-
phoric individuals, using the laboratory manipulation described
above. The specific aims of this study were nonetheless threefold.
First, it aimed to investigate the extent of MW, measured both
behaviorally and via self-report, in individuals with varying lev-
els of dysphoria using the SART. Second, it aimed to examine
whether a task manipulation can be used to modulate not only
performance, but also the subjective experience of MW, such that
“mindlessness” was more evident on the SART than on a task
with a higher probability of targets, particularly in dysphoric indi-
viduals. Third, this study aimed to explore the extent to which
behavioral performance on these tasks related to self reports of
MW, dispositional mindfulness or “acting with awareness,” and
to individual differences in rumination and everyday attention
failures.
We based our hypotheses on predictions arising from neu-
ropsychological investigations of cognitive function and sustained
attention in depressed and brain-injured populations and on
those arising from the burgeoning literature on MW and mood.
First, we hypothesized that there would be more commission
errors on the SART than on the high probability task across par-
ticipants. Our second hypothesis was that our task manipulation
would also influence retrospective reports of subjective MW dur-
ing task completion such that these would be higher following
the SART than following the high probability task. Third, we
predicted that the differential effects of our task modulation on
commission errors and possibly RTCV, as well as subjective indi-
cators of MW, would be particularly pronounced in dysphoric,
relative to nondysphoric, participants. Our fourth hypothesis was
that errors on the low probability SART would correlate positively
with subjective retrospective reports of MW, self-report measures
of everyday attentional failures (ARCES), and trait rumination,
and negatively with subjective reports of everyday mindfulness
(AAS of the FFMQ).
MATERIALS AND METHODS
PARTICIPANTS
A community sample of 44 participants with varying levels of
depression severity, indexed using the BDI-II, was recruited from
the Medical Research Council Cognition and Brain Sciences Unit
(MRC CBU) participant panel. One participant was set aside due
to extremely high error and omission rates, reflecting a failure
to understand the task instructions, leaving 43 (31 female) par-
ticipants between 18 and 64 years of age. The mean BDI of this
sample was 9.84 (SD = 9.36), with BDI scores ranging between
0 and 29. According to the recommended BDI-II cutoffs (Beck
et al., 1996), two participants had mild (BDI between 14 and
19), seven participants had moderate (between 20 and 28), and
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1 had severe depression (29 or greater). Premorbid verbal IQ
was assessed using the National Adult Reading Test (Nelson and
Willison, 1991). The study was approved by the local research
ethics committee, and all participants provided written informed
consent prior to taking part in the study. Participants received an
honorarium of £6 per hour for their participation in the project.
Demographic and mood characteristics are given in Table 1.
PROCEDURE
Participants attended a 90min session during which they were
seated in a comfortable chair in a quiet room. Participants com-
pleted the cognitive tasks and measures described below. Both the
SART and high target probability tasks were completed by all par-
ticipants, interleaved with a neutral filler task. The order in which
the SART and high probability tasks were completed was delivered
in a counterbalanced order. Several additional measures were also
administered but are not reported here.
SUSTAINED ATTENTION TO RESPONSE TASK (SART; Robertson et al.,
1997; Manly et al., 1999)
The SART is a computerized go/no-go task that was presented
using ePrime software and requires participants to make a single
button press to all stimuli except the designated no-go “tar-
get.” The digits 1–9 were the stimuli; the digit “3” was the
target. These were presented in a quasi-random order for 250ms,
followed by a 900ms mask comprised of a 29mm diameter
white ring with a white diagonal cross through it. The dig-
its were presented centrally on a computer screen, in a white
font against a black background. Five different font sizes (48,
72, 94, 100, and 120 point), corresponding to stimulus heights
of 12–29mm, were presented at random to reduce the like-
lihood of participants making responses based on perceptual
templates of the stimuli and to encourage instead processing
of the numerical values. Participants sat ∼60 cm away from
the computer monitor and were instructed to respond via but-
ton press to every digit (go trial) except “3” (no-go trial),
giving equal weight to speed and accuracy. There were 270
trials presented in a continuous block lasting 5.2min, with
each of the digits from 1 to 9 (including the target “3”) pre-
sented 30 times, such that the probability of no-go targets
was 0.11. The 270 test trials were preceded by 18 practice
trials.
The critical SART measure is the number of no-to trials on
which a participant fails to withhold a response (i.e., errors of
commission). However, other performance measures include: (1)
RT for correct responses on go trials (RT); (2) a measure of
within-participant variability of RTs, such as the standard devi-
ation (SD), or when mean RT and RT variance is positively corre-
lated (Seli et al., 2012), the RT coefficient of variation (RTCV),
which is computed by dividing the SD by the mean RT across
all trials; and (3) failures to respond to go trials (i.e., omission
errors).
HIGH TARGET PROBABILITY TASK (Manly et al., 1999)
The present study also included a modified response withholding
task. This go/no-go task, also presented using ePrime software,
was identical to the SART in all respects except that the frequency
of the no-go target was very much increased. In this high proba-
bility variant, the target (“3”) was presented on half of the trials
such that the target probability was 0.5. For the purpose of data
analysis, it was considered necessary to equalize the number of
targets in the two versions of the task. Thus, in the high probabil-
ity task, 30 of the 135 target trials were designated for analysis in
advance and at random, such that performance on these could be
compared with the 30 target trials from the SART task.
FILLER TASK
To reduce the impact of carryover effects from performance and
ratings on one variant of the SART to the other, participants
viewed a brief 5-min neutral video in between of an individual
talking about a neutral household task, e.g., hanging a picture.
THINKING CONTENT SCALE OF THE DUNDEE STRESS STATE
QUESTIONNAIRE (DSSQ; Matthews et al., 1999, 2002)
This scale was used to index self-reported MW, retrospectively,
immediately subsequent to completion of both the SART and
the high probability tasks. The 16 items, which were embedded
within the ePrime stimulus presentation software, required par-
ticipants to indicate roughly how often they had had thoughts
relating to each of a number of themes while performing the
tasks, by choosing the appropriate number on a scale with end-
points 1 “never” to 5 “very often.” Participants reported the
frequency of two types of subjective experience according to
each of 2 eight-item factors (1) the experience of thoughts
that are unrelated to what one is doing, that is, TUT (e.g., “I
Table 1 | Demographic characteristics and mood measure data for study participants.
All participants (n = 43) Low BDI (n = 10) High BDI (n = 10) Low vs. High BDI comparison
Age 38.44 (15.47) 35.60 (12.12) 42.80 (16.10) t(18) = −1.13, p = 0.27
FSIQ 113.10 (10.38) 111.88 (8.99) 112.74 (11.14) t(18) = −0.19, p = 0.85
BDI-II 9.84 (9.36) 0.20 (0.42) 24.75 (4.30) t(18) = −17.95, p < 0.001
RS 21.02 (5.54) 16.10 (5.00) 27.30 (2.58) t(18) = −6.29, p < 0.001
ARCES 33.44 (7.13) 30.80 (5.22) 39.90 (7.89) t(18) = −3.04, p < 0.01
AAS 18.16 (5.20) 21.90 (4.12) 12.10 (4.07) t(18) = 5.35, p < 0.001
Data are mean (SD).
SD, standard deviation; FSIQ, Full Scale IQ estimated using the National Adult Reading Test (NART); BDI, Beck Depression Inventory; RS, Short Response Styles
Questionnaire; ARCES, Attention-Related Cognitive Errors Scale; AAS, Acting with Awareness Scale of the Five-Facet Mindfulness Questionnaire (FFMQ).
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thought about personal worries” or “I thought about some-
thing that happened earlier today”), and (2) the experience of
interfering thoughts regarding one’s performance of the task,
that is, TRI (e.g., “I thought about my level of ability” or
“I thought about how much time I had left”). Of these two
types of subjective experience, TUT is the index that is gen-
erally considered to correspond most closely to conceptualiza-
tions of MW (Smallwood et al., 2009; Stawarczyk et al., 2011).
However, reports of TRI are also considered to be associated
with reduced performance on the SART (Stawarczyk et al.,
2011).
POSITIVE AND NEGATIVE MIND-WANDERING RATING SCALES
The specific nature of the TUT items of the DSSQmeant that this
scale was unlikely to capture all incidences of MW experienced
by our participants. Thus, immediately prior to completing the
DSSQ items upon completion of the SART and high probability
tasks, two prompts indexed the valence of participants’ off-task
thoughts: “I thought about something positive” and “I thought
about something negative.” These prompts were presented fol-
lowing the general instruction (identical to that described above
for the DSSQ) to indicate roughly how often participants had
had each of the following thoughts while performing the task, by
choosing the appropriate number on a scale from 1 “never” to 5
“very often.” Thus, these items indexed the extent to which par-
ticipants’ minds wandered to positive or negative themes while
completing the tasks.
NATIONAL ADULT READING TEST—REVISED (NART; Nelson and
Willison, 1991)
The NART is frequently used to estimate premorbid mental abil-
ity in patient and vulnerable groups as it contains 50 phonetically
irregular words that require prior knowledge for their correct
pronunciation. It is therefore considered to be resistant to the cog-
nitive effects of psychopathology such as depression, providing a
valid estimate of premorbid IQ (Crawford et al., 1987).
BECK DEPRESSION INVENTORY—SECOND EDITION (BDI-II; Beck et al.,
1996)
The BDI-II is one of the most widely used instruments for mea-
suring the severity of self-reported depression, or dysphoria. It
contains 21 items that relate to mood (e.g., sadness and irri-
tability), cognition (e.g., indecisiveness and guilt), and physical
symptoms (e.g., changes in appetite and fatigue). Each item is
rated on a 4-point scale with endpoints 0 and 3. The points
for each item are summed to give a total BDI score, and it has
been recommended that the severity of depression is indexed as
follows: 0–13 = minimal depression; 14–19 = mild depression;
20–28 = moderate depression; and 29–63 = severe depression
(Beck et al., 1996). The BDI-II is known to have strong psy-
chometric properties, including high internal consistency and
concurrent validity (Storch et al., 2004).
SHORT RESPONSE STYLES QUESTIONNAIRE (RS) (Treynor et al., 2003)
Depressive rumination was assessed using the 10 item RS. Items
such as “I think, Why do I always react this way?” were rated on
a 4-point scale with endpoints 1 “never” to 4 “always.” The short
RS—which includes items that tap the key features of a rumina-
tive response, such as focusing on one’s negative emotional state,
on self-evaluation, and on the causes and consequences of one’s
depressed mood—resulted from the removal from the 22 item
Ruminative Responses Scale (RRS) of 12 items that were deemed
similar to BDI items.
ACTING WITH AWARENESS SCALE (AAS) OF THE FIVE-FACET
MINDFULNESS QUESTIONNAIRE (FFMQ; Baer et al., 2006)
This scale was employed to provide a measure of self-reported
trait MW. Only the 8 items from the “acting with awareness” sub-
scale were administered. Participants rated whether each item is
generally true of them, on a scale ranging from 1 “never or very
rarely true” to 5 “very often or always true.” The items assess the
tendency to attend to one’s activities in the moment as opposed to
behaving on “automatic pilot” (e.g., “When I do things, my mind
wanders off and I’m easily distracted”). In conceptual terms, the
items measure MW but they are reverse scored so that each gives
a measure of acting with awareness.
ATTENTION-RELATED COGNITIVE ERRORS SCALE (ARCES) (Cheyne
et al., 2006)
The ARCES is a brief self-report scale that measures the frequency
of everyday performance failures for which an attention lapse or
failure of sustained attention is the most likely cause. Cheyne et al.
(2006) found that scores on the ARCES correlate significantly
with commission errors on the SART.
RESULTS
For all analyses, alpha was set at p = 0.05, and the results of
two-tailed tests are reported. Pearson correlations were initially
computed to determine the relationships between various trait
measures of mood and attention. To assess the influence of the
probability of no-go target manipulation on behavioral and MW
performance, data were assessed using paired t-tests or repeated-
measures ANOVAs as appropriate. To examine whether these
effects were further modulated by depressive symptomatology,
the data were analyzed using two methods. First, data were
analyzed continuously with mean-centered BDI scores entered
into analyses as a covariate. This was considered appropriate
as participants were recruited to provide a range of depressive
symptoms. Second, data were analyzed on the basis of whether
participants fell into a low or high BDI group. Previous work
investigating groups of individuals that differed with respect
to self-reported everyday cognitive failures and their perfor-
mance on the SART selected individuals falling in the lower
and upper quartile of the range for this characteristic across the
entire sample (Manly et al., 1999). Adopting the same approach
here, participants falling within the upper and lower quartile
of BDI-II scores were selected such that 10 high and 10 low
BDI participants were placed in the high and low BDI groups,
respectively.
Whereas a median split on our sample would have placed a
significant number of participants with minimal levels of depres-
sion in our “high BDI” group, the present approach ensured
that all participants in this group minimally had mild self-report
depression. While small, these sample sizes are in line with those
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employed in group analyses that have been described previously
(Manly et al., 1999; O’Connell et al., 2008) and furthermore cir-
cumvent the difficulties inherent at moderate levels of depressive
symptomatology where some participants with lower levels of
BDI reported a history of depression whereas those with higher
levels did not. Characteristics for the low and high BDI groups
are given in Table 1. Importantly, these groups did not differ sig-
nificantly with respect to age or NART FSIQ (both ps > 0.25).
They did, however, differ markedly with respect to their scores on
all of the questionnaires that indexed mood, everyday attention-
related cognitive errors, and state MW: BDI-II [t(18) = 17.95,
p < 0.001], RS [t(18) = 6.29, p < 0.001], ARCES [t(18) = 3.04,
p < 0.01], AAS [t(18) = −5.35, p < 0.001].
RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN DIFFERENT SYMPTOMMEASURES
The relationships between the various mood and attention mea-
sures are presented in Table 2. In line with previous investiga-
tions, a strong correlation was observed between symptoms of
depression indexed using the BDI-II and depressive rumination
measured using the RS (p < 0.001). Furthermore, BDI-II scores
correlated positively with the ARCES, a measure of self-reported
attention-related cognitive errors (r = 0.57, p < 0.001) and neg-
atively with scores on the acting with awareness scale of the AAS
(r = −0.68, p < 0.001). Thus, as would be expected, individuals
with greater levels of depression symptomatology reported mak-
ing attention-related errors to a greater extent and reported acting
with awareness to a lesser extent than those with reduced levels of
depression symptoms.
EFFECTS OF TARGET PROBABILITY ON SART PERFORMANCE
Behavioral data for the SART and high probability task are pre-
sented in Table 3. Our manipulation of the probability of no-go
targets on the SART had the intended effect on task performance.
Overall, participants made significantly more errors of commis-
sion (incorrect responses to no-go targets) on the SART relative
to the high probability target task [t(42) = 10.86, p < 0.001].
RTs were also affected by task, with significantly lower RTs on
the SART relative to high target probability task [t(42) = −9.35,
p < 0.001]. Given the high correlation between mean RT and the
variability of RTs (SD) [r(43) = 0.62, p < 0.001], we analyzed the
RTCV instead as it has been recommended as a more suitable
measure under these circumstances (Seli et al., 2012). This was
higher in the SART than in the high probability task [t(42) = 2.29,
Table 2 | Correlations between demographic and mood variables
across the entire sample (N = 43).
RS ARCES AAS
BDI-II 0.77* 0.57* −0.68*
RS 0.50* −0.63*
ARCES −0.79*
BDI, Beck Depression Inventory; RS, Short Response Styles Questionnaire;
ARCES, Attention-Related Cognitive Errors Scale; AAS, Acting with Awareness
Scale of the Five-Facet Mindfulness Questionnaire (FFMQ); *p < 0.001.
p < 0.05]. Errors of omission (failing to respond on “go” tri-
als) were very low and equated to approximately 0.8% of trials
overall. As omission data violated the assumptions of paramet-
ric analysis, a Wilcoxon sign ranked test was conducted, but no
effect of task was found (p = 0.33). Thus, consistent with pre-
vious reports (Manly et al., 1999), reducing the frequency with
which participants were required to withhold responses to no-
go targets—on tasks that were otherwise identical in terms of
stimulus type and duration, inter-stimulus interval, number of
trials, and required behavioral response—resulted in a signifi-
cantly greater number of commission errors, quicker responses,
and significantly more variable responding as indexed by the
RTCV.
EFFECTS OF TARGET PROBABILITY ON SELF-REPORTED MIND
WANDERING
As described above, subjective experience during the SART and
high probability task was indexed using the Thinking Content
scale of the DSSQ. This was administered immediately following
performance of both the SART and high probability task, provid-
ing retrospective and subjective measures of TRI and TUT while
performing the task. As the specific items on the DSSQ may not
have captured the full extent of experienced MW, and because the
DSSQ does not specify the valence of these thoughts, additional
scales were administered to index the extent to which participants’
minds wandered to positive and negative themes.
A Two-Way repeatedmeasures ANOVAwas conducted on self-
report data, with task (SART, high probability task) and thought
content (TRI/TUT) as repeated measures. Though participants
reported more TRI/TUT overall in the SART than in the high
probability task (see Table 3), this main effect did not achieve
significance [F(1, 42) = 3.00, p = 0.09]. There was a significant
effect of thought content [F(1, 42) = 73.84, p < 0.001] which was
due to participants reporting significantly more TRI than TUT
overall (TRI: 2.33 ± 0.75; TUT: 1.54 ± 0.53). This effect was
qualified by a significant interaction between task and thought
Table 3 | Behavioral performance and subjective experience data for
all participants in the SART and high probability task.
College SART High probability task
BEHAVIORAL PERFORMANCE
Mean errors of commission 9.95 (4.89) 2.47 (2.27)
Mean errors of omission 1.98 (4.44) 2.07 (6.43)
RT 358.61 (73.18) 421.72 (56.77)
RTCV 0.26 (0.09) 0.23 (0.09)
SUBJECTIVE EXPERIENCE
TRI 2.43 (0.77) 2.23 (0.71)
TUT 1.52 (0.47) 1.57 (0.59)
Positive MW 1.93 (0.94) 2.00 (1.00)
Negative MW 2.35 (1.15) 1.98 (0.94)
Data are mean (SD) values.
SART, Sustained Attention to Response Task; BDI, Beck Depression Inventory;
RT, Response times; RTCV, RT coefficient of variation; TRI, task-related interfer-
ence; TUT, task-unrelated thought; MW, mind-wandering.
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content [F(1, 42) = 7.59, p < 0.01]. TRI was more prevalent on
the SART than on the high probability task [t(42) = 10.34, p <
0.001] whereas TUT did not differ significantly across the two
tasks (p = 0.34).
A Two-Way ANOVA with task (SART, high probability task)
and MW valence (positive, negative) as repeated measures
demonstrated a main effect of task [F(1, 42) = 4.23, p < 0.05]
and a significant task by valence interaction [F(1, 42) = 4.99,
p < 0.05]. A significant main effect of valence did not emerge
[F(1, 42) = 1.47, p = 0.23]. Thus, reports of positive/negative
MW were higher following completion of the SART than that
of the high probability task, an effect that appeared to be due to
increased MW on negative themes. This finding will be discussed
further, in relation to dysphoric symptoms, below.
INFLUENCE OF DEPRESSIVE SYMPTOMATOLOGY ON TASK
PERFORMANCE
With respect to behavioral performance on the two versions of
the SART, there were two predictions. First, dysphoric mood was
expected to have a negative impact upon SART performance,
particularly in terms of the number of commission errors, but
possibly also in terms of RT and RT variability. Second, any influ-
ence of depression on performance was expected to be more
evident on the SART than on the high probability task (cf. Manly
et al., 2004).
These predictions received partial support when commission
error data were analyzed as a continuous design with task as
a repeated measure (SART, high probability task) and mean-
centered BDI as a covariate. The main effect of mean-centered
BDI-II approached significance [F(1, 41) = 3.73, p = 0.06], with a
higher number of commission errors produced by high relative to
low BDI participants. The interaction between BDI-II scores and
task, however, did not [F(1,41) = 1.97, p = 0.17]. Thus, although
participants made more SART errors on the SART relative to the
high probability task (see above), and increasing self-reported
depression symptomatology was associated with increasing num-
bers of commission errors overall, the difference in performance
was not significantly modulated by symptom severity indexed
continuously by the BDI-II.
In the group analyses, repeated-measures ANOVAs were
employed with task (SART, high probability task) as the within-
subjects factor and BDI group (low, high) as the between-subjects
factor. Analysis of commission error data confirmed the signif-
icant effect of task in this smaller group [F(1, 18) = 57.59, p <
0.001]. It also revealed a significant effect of group [F(1,18) =
5.39, p < 0.05] that was qualified by a significant task by group
interaction [F(1,18) = 4.37, p = 0.05]. As shown in Figure 1, the
significant interaction was due to the high BDI group making sig-
nificantly more errors of commission than the low BDI group
on the SART [t(18) = 2.37, p < 0.05] whereas the group differ-
ence on the high probability task was not significant [t(18) = 1.50,
p = 0.15].
Conducting the continuous analysis for mean RTs demon-
strated no significant effect of BDI-II (F < 1) but an interaction
between task and BDI-II that approached significance [F(1,41) =
3.54, p = 0.07], in line with the significant interaction between
task and group in the group analysis of RTs, described below.
FIGURE 1 | Mean errors of commission on the SART and on a modified
version of the task in low and high BDI participant groups. Error bars
are 1 SD.
BDI was not found to have a significant influence in the anal-
ysis of RTCV [F(1,41) = 2.59, p = 0.11] or to interact with task
(F < 1). Given that omission data were not only unsuitable for
parametric analysis but were also unaffected by our task manipu-
lation (see above), we computed the difference in omission errors
across the two tasks (difference score = SART omissions minus
high probability task omissions); a Spearman correlation indi-
cated the absence of a relationship between this difference score
and dysphoric symptoms measured with the BDI-II (p = 0.70)
and so this was not investigated further.
The group analysis conducted on mean RTs confirmed the
significant effect of task in this smaller group [F(1,18) = 33.94,
p < 0.001] that was qualified by a significant task by group inter-
action [F(1,18) = 6.20, p < 0.05]. The quicker RTs observed on
the SART relative to the high probability task were more pro-
nounced in the high BDI [t(9) = 9.27, p < 0.001] than low BDI
[t(9) = 1.87, p = 0.09] group. The main effect of group was not
significant [F(1,18) = 0.31, p = 0.58]. Consistent with the RTCV
results obtained in the continuous analysis above, there was a
significant effect of group [F(1, 18) = 5.59, p < 0.05], which was
due to increased variability in the high BDI group. The effect of
task also approached significance [F(1,18) = 1.35, p = 0.07], but
the interaction between group and task did not [F(1,18) = 1.35,
p = 0.26]. Thus, as anticipated, RT variability was higher in high
BDI participants and there was a trend toward there being greater
RT variability in the SART than in the high probability task in this
smaller group.
INFLUENCE OF DYSPHORIC SYMPTOMS ON SELF-REPORT INDICES OF
MIND-WANDERING
Whereas the Acting with Awareness scale of the FFMQ provided
a measure of the extent to which participants felt they acted
with awareness in general, the Thinking Content scale of the
DSSQ and positive and negative MW scales provided an index
of subjective experience and MW during completion of the lab-
oratory tasks. These measures were conceptualized as trait and
state, or dispositional and situational, measures of MW, respec-
tively. The Thinking Content scale provided separate measures of
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TRI and TUT. Participant data for these measures are provided in
Tables 1, 4.
As noted above, greater severity of dysphoria was associated
with lower FFMQ AAS scores, that is, greater self-reported MW
in everyday life (r = −0.68, p < 0.001). Consistent with this pat-
tern, the group analysis demonstrated significantly lower scores
on this scale in the high BDI relative to the low BDI group
[t(18) = −5.35, p < 0.001; see Table 1].
In continuous analyses of subjective experience during the
SART and high probability tasks, participants with higher BDI
scores reported more TUT/TRI overall [F(1, 41) = 6.00, p <
0.05]. However, BDI did not interact with task (SART vs. high
probability task) [F(1, 41) = 0.04; p = 0.85], thought content
(TRI vs. TUT) [F(1, 41) = 1.58, p = 0.22], or both [F(1,41) =
0.68, p = 0.42]. This pattern was replicated in the group analy-
sis where there was a main effect of BDI group [F(1, 18) = 9.48,
p < 0.01], with the dysphoric group reporting more TUT/TRI
than the non-dysphoric group. Interactions of BDI group with
task [F(1,18) = 1.43, p = 0.25], thought content (F < 1), or both
(F < 1) did not approach significance.
With respect to ratings of positive and negative MW, as noted
above, participants on average reported greater levels of MW on
the SART relative to high probability task, an effect that was due to
elevated MW on negative themes. Neither continuous nor group
analyses indicated an influence of BDI on MW overall [F(1, 41) =
0.79, p = 0.38; F(1, 18) = 2.06, p = 0.17]. However, there was a
significant interaction between valence and BDI group [F(1, 18) =
13.69, p < 0.001]. Whereas levels of negative MW were signif-
icantly higher in the dysphoric than in the control participants
[t(18) = 3.30, p < 0.01], levels of positive MW were not found to
differ significantly [t(18) = 0.54, p = 0.60]. The 3-way interaction
between task, valence, and participant group, however, was not
significant [F(1, 18) = 0.24, p = 0.62].
EFFECTS OF AGE ON TASK PERFORMANCE AND SUBJECTIVE MW
Although we did not have any a priori hypotheses regarding age,
research has sometimes shown that the incidence of depression
may be higher in older individuals and furthermore that the inci-
dence of MW may decline in older adults. In the present sample,
age did not relate to BDI-II (r = 0.17, p = 0.27) or to our dispo-
sitional measure of MW (r = 0.07, p = 0.67). However, there was
some indication that reports of MW decrease with increasing age
following both the SART and the high probability task, respec-
tively, (correlation between age and TUT: r = −0.30, p = 0.05
and r = −0.38, p = 0.01, following the SART and high probabil-
ity tasks, respectively). Given this association, the analyses above
were repeated with age entered as a covariate. The pattern of
results reported above remained virtually the same in all cases;
that is, in no case did a result change from being significant to
non-significant or vice versa.
BEHAVIORAL AND SELF-REPORT MEASURES OF MW AND THEIR
RELATION TO OTHER PARTICIPANT VARIABLES
An average measure of stimulus-independent thought was com-
puted for each participant by taking the average of reports of
TRI and TUT. Pearson correlations focused on commission errors
for the SART and high probability task as the majority of stud-
ies on MW and cognitive failures have emphasized this measure.
These are presented in Table 5. Though commission errors on
the SART and high probability task were found to correlate
highly (r = 0.39, p = 0.01) and the relationship between subjec-
tiveMW and commission errors on the SARTwas significant (r =
0.55, p < 0.01), the relationship between MW and errors on the
high probability task was not (r = 0.01, p = 0.94). Furthermore,
the relationship between errors on the SART and rumination
approached significance (r = 0.29, p = 0.06), whereas this did
not achieve significance for the high probability task (r = 0.17,
p = 0.28). No association was found between commission errors
and either the AAS “acting with awareness” subscale of the FFMQ
or everyday attentional failures measured by the ARCES for either
task (ps > 0.25). It is worth noting that when these correla-
tions were repeated with only TUT as a measure of MW, the
correlations were broadly similar to those reported above for the
TUT/TRI composite; however, the relationship between TUT and
Table 4 | Behavioral performance and subjective experience data for participants in the high and low BDI groups.
SART High probability task
Low BDI (n = 10) High BDI (n = 10) Low BDI (n = 10) High BDI (n = 10)
BEHAVIORAL PERFORMANCE
Mean errors of commission 6.40 (4.32) 11.60 (5.44) 1.4 (1.08) 2.80 (2.74)
Mean errors of omission 0.40 (1.27) 3.90 (7.39) 0.20 (0.63) 2.60 (5.30)
RT 408.25 (96.54) 367.65 (65.36) 440.21 (17.21) 447.29 (57.18)
RTCV 0.21 (0.04) 0.30 (0.10) 0.20 (0.04) 0.26 (0.08)
SUBJECTIVE EXPERIENCE
TRI 1.87 (0.49) 2.74 (0.73) 2.00 (0.58) 2.49 (0.62)
TUT 1.23 (0.40) 1.63 (0.49) 1.29 (0.28) 1.78 (0.80)
Positive MW 1.90 (0.88) 1.70 (0.95) 1.90 (0.99) 1.70 (0.82)
Negative MW 1.70 (0.95) 2.90 (0.57) 1.60 (0.70) 2.50 (0.97)
Data are mean (SD) values.
SART, Sustained Attention to Response Task; BDI, Beck Depression Inventory; RT, Response times; RTCV, RT coefficient of variation; TRI, task-related interference;
TUT, task-unrelated thought; MW, mind-wandering.
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Table 5 | Correlations between behavioral performance, self-reported
















































aStimulus-independent thought was computed as the average of reported TUT
and TRI following completion of the SART or high probability task; AAS, Acting
with Awareness Scale; ARCES, Attention-Related Cognitive Errors Scale; RS,
Short Response Styles Questionnaire.
rumination was not significant (SART: r = 0.24, p = 0.13; high
probability task: r = 0.26, p = 0.09).
DISCUSSION
This exploratory study investigated whether a task manipulation
that has been shown previously to discriminate between individu-
als with high and low levels of everyday inattentiveness modulates
behavioral and self-report indicators of MW, particularly in dys-
phoric individuals. The two cognitive tasks were go/no-go tasks
that require participants to make a response on go trials and to
withhold a response on critical no-go “target” trials. In the SART,
the probability of no-go trials was 11% whereas on a high prob-
ability go/no-go task that was matched in every other respect,
the probability of no-go targets was 50%. Previous research has
shown that a reduced probability of no-go trials increases the ten-
dency to automatic and “mindless” responding and performance
has been linked to everyday absentmindedness in the form of
cognitive failures in brain-injured populations (Robertson et al.,
1997; Manly et al., 1999). Furthermore, performance indices on
the SART, typically commission errors and RTCV, have increas-
ingly been conceptualized as behavioral indicators of MW (e.g.,
Smallwood et al., 2004; McVay and Kane, 2009; Marchetti et al.,
2012).
In support of Hypothesis 1 and in line with previous data
(Manly et al., 1999), our manipulation of the probability of no-
go targets had the intended effect on task performance. Overall,
participants made significantly more errors of commission in the
SART relative to the high probability task. This replicates previous
work showing that it is more difficult to sustain one’s attention
when there is a low probability of targets (Giambra, 1995; Manly
et al., 1999). Also consistent with previous reports, participants
had quicker but more variable RTs in the SART relative to the high
probability task. It has been suggested that RT variability may
reflect subtle differences in RT that are due to lapses of attention
(e.g., McVay and Kane, 2009; Seli et al., 2012).
Subjective and retrospective reports of thought content (TUT
and TRI) during the SART and the high probability task were
indexed using the DSSQ (Matthews et al., 1999, 2002). Additional
scales were also administered to index the extent to which par-
ticipants’ minds wandered to positive and negative themes. The
data here partially supported Hypothesis 2. Overall, participants
reported higher levels of TRI than TUT, an effect that was more
evident following the SART than the high probability task. MW
was also higher for negative than positive content and higher fol-
lowing the SART than following the high probability task. Rates
of positive and (especially) negative MW were further elevated
following the SART relative to the high probability task. Thus,
behavioral and self-report data are broadly consistent with the
idea that the SART can be conceptualized as a laboratory index
of mindlessness (e.g., Smallwood et al., 2009). The current study
further indicates that this claim can bemade with some specificity
as behavioral and self-report indicators of MW were elevated in
the SART relative to the high probability task. It is worth noting
that though a previous investigation examined performance on
the SART with a high and low probability of targets (Smallwood
et al., 2004) that study additionally manipulated the speed of pre-
sentation and did not specifically examine the relationship of their
findings to dysphoric mood. Thus, it was not possible to ascertain
how target probability interacted with mood status to influence
performance and subjective experience.
There was also some support for our third hypothesis that
dysphoric individuals would demonstrate difficulties that were
either exclusive to or more pronounced on the SART than on
the high probability task. Though depression severity was not
found to interact significantly with the two tasks in analyses
that included BDI as a continuous measure, the analysis of high
and low dysphoric individuals confirmed a task by dysphoric
group interaction. This interaction was due to dysphoric partici-
pants making more errors of commission than the non-dysphoric
group on the SART but not the high probability task. Though
it has been shown previously that depression is associated with
impairments on the SART (Farrin et al., 2003, but see Carriere
et al., 2008; Deng et al., 2012), it was not possible to ascertain
from those studies whether the observed deficits were due tomore
general aspects of the task, such as the requirement to withhold a
behavioral response, or specifically to the low probability of tar-
gets that encouraged a highly repetitive response and tendency to
a habitual mode of “mindless” responding (Robertson et al., 1997;
Manly et al., 1999). The current findings suggest that these earlier
findings (Farrin et al., 2003; Stawarczyk et al., 2012) are unlikely
to reflect a general cognitive or behavioral deficit in dysphoric
participants and are more likely to relate to difficulties sustaining
attention over time that is, maintaining an executive stance over
what might otherwise become repetitive and automatic respond-
ing. As anticipated, the pattern observed here in dysphoric and
non-dysphoric groups resembles that found previously in indi-
viduals that differed in everyday self-reported absentmindedness
(Manly et al., 1999).
This study furthermore predicted increased subjective reports
of MW in dysphoric relative to non-dysphoric participants, par-
ticularly in the SART. The first part of this prediction received
clear support. Both continuous and group analyses of MW data
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showed dysphoric, relative to non-dysphoric, participants report-
ing increased levels of subjective MW (TRI/TUT). However, the
effects of BDI were not found to interact with task or type of sub-
jective experience. This indicates that the higher levels of TRI in
the SART relative to high probability task were present to an equal
extent in high and low BDI individuals. The extent of negative but
not positive MW was significantly higher in the dysphoric than
non-dysphoric participants but again, the higher levels of negative
MW following the SART relative to high probability task did not
interact with BDI. These results add to existing findings showing
that induced unhappy mood leads to an increase in past-focused
MW (Smallwood and O’Connor, 2011). They furthermore sug-
gest that again our modulation had similar effects on MW in
the high and low BDI participants. Across the sample, subjective
reports of stimulus-independent thought were found to corre-
late with commission errors on the SART but not on the high
probability task. Furthermore, there was a significant correlation
between BDI and AAS scores, showing that dysphoric individu-
als rate themselves as acting with reduced awareness in everyday
life, or being less mindful. Given that MW and mindfulness are
conceptualized as opposing constructs both here and elsewhere
(Mrazek et al., 2012), the correlation between BDI and acting
with awareness scores is consistent with dysphoric individuals
reporting difficulties with MW in everyday life.
Taken together, these data provide partial support for
our hypotheses relating to the subjective experience of MW.
Dysphoric participants reported experiencing elevated MW
across three different self-report measures—(1) a retrospective
measure of TRI/TUT experience during task performance; (2)
a retrospective measure of MW on negative but not positive
themes; and (3) a trait measure of MW in everyday life. However,
though our task manipulation resulted in higher levels of self-
reported stimulus-independent thought, and particularly self-
reported TRI and negative MW, this was not evident to a greater
extent in our dysphoric sample.
Consistent with predictions, the relationship between subjec-
tive reports of stimulus-independent thought and commission
errors on the SART was significant and there was some indication
of a relationship between SART errors and rumination scores.
In contrast to expectations, no association was found between
SART errors and either the AAS or everyday attentional fail-
ures measured by the ARCES. Thus, the associations described
in Hypothesis 4 were partially supported. The reason for the fail-
ure to find these latter associations is unclear, as previous research
conducted in 363 participants demonstrated a reliable association
between SART errors and scores on the ARCES and a specifically-
derived measure of mindful attention awareness (Smilek et al.,
2010), but limited power is likely to have played a role.
Why the effects of our task manipulation on subjective experi-
ence were seen primarily for TRI rather than TUT is not apparent,
as previous work has shown that it is reports of TUT, in particular
that relate to SART performance metrics (e.g., Smallwood et al.,
2009; Stawarczyk et al., 2011). TRI incorporates thoughts about
the task that are not directed at actual completion and reports are
thus considered to be associated with suboptimal performance
(Matthews et al., 1999; Stawarczyk et al., 2011). There are fur-
ther differences between these two types of thought. For example,
TUT increases with increasing time on task, whereas TRI does
not (Stawarczyk et al., 2011). It has been suggested that TRI may
to an extent reflect strategic deployment of attention to the task
in response to an attentional lapse (Smallwood et al., 2004). It is
unlikely, however, that the present elevated levels of negative MW
can be explained solely by higher TRI reports, however, as nega-
tive MW, but not specifically TRI (as indicated by the absence of
an interaction between BDI and thought content), was elevated
in dysphoric relative to non-dysphoric participants.
As this was an exploratory study, it is particularly important
to acknowledge its limitations. First, the sample was small and
contained a majority of participants with low BDI scores. This
meant that applying a median split to the sample would have
produced a dysphoric group that included a significant num-
ber of participants with BDI-II scores of 8 and above, but 14 is
the recommended threshold for “mild depression” on the BDI-
II (Beck et al., 1996). Adopting an upper and lower quartile
approach instead meant that all participants in the dysphoric
group achieved the minimum depression cutoff, but admittedly,
the resulting dysphoric and non-dysphoric samples were small.
Reliable SART effects have been reported previously in compara-
bly small samples (Manly et al., 1999), but whether this applies
to self-report measures of MW is less clear. The current findings
would thus benefit from replication in larger samples of clearly
defined depressed and non-depressed participants.
Second, assessing MW retrospectively may not be the opti-
mal way to assess the subjective experience of MW during a
task. The advantages and disadvantages of these approaches have
been discussed elsewhere (e.g., Smallwood and Schooler, 2006).
Retrospective reports rely on thought content being available to
awareness and memory retrospectively, and this may be particu-
larly problematic where there are difficulties with memory, as can
be the case in depression (Johnson and Magaro, 1987; Dalgleish
et al., 2007). An alternative is to use “probe” or self-caught meth-
ods, which allow the participant to specify the focus of their
attention and the presence or absence of MW online. The dis-
advantage of these approaches, however, is that the prompts can
interfere with the very processes that are under investigation and
it would have been a challenge to implement these alongside the
task manipulation employed here. A third potential limitation is
that reports of TUT were low in this study. As it has been sug-
gested that time on task increases MW (Smallwood et al., 2003),
lengthening the duration over which participants are required to
sustain their attention could be beneficially applied here.
A final issue is the extent to which behavioral performance on
the SART is a good behavioral, objective, index of MW. Whereas
some investigators have argued that the SART requires sustained
attention to response rather than a response inhibition capac-
ity (e.g., Manly et al., 1999), others have argued that the SART
places high response inhibition, and not necessarily sustained
attention, demands on participants (e.g., Carter et al., 2013). It is
thus possible that any requirement for response inhibition could
be higher in the SART than the high probability task, due to
the lower frequency of no-go targets. Consequently, the poorer
relative performance on the SART observed in our dysphoric
participants could be due, at least in part, to difficulties with
response inhibition—an interpretation that could explain why
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dysphoria was found to predict differences in performance, but
not self-report MW, across the two tasks. In this respect, it is
worth noting, first of all that depression is not routinely associ-
ated with deficits in inhibitory control over behavioral responding
(e.g., Murphy et al., 1999), and second of all that there are possi-
ble alternate explanations for this difference across measures. For
instance, the reports of depressed individuals may not accurately
reflect MW episodes due to reduced meta-awareness or alter-
natively, difficulties with memory that are frequently associated
with depression (Ramponi et al., 2004), as noted above. Future
empirical work is required to ascertain the relative contributions
of these different processes and their relationship to dysphoric
mood.
Despite these limitations, our findings provide encouraging
preliminary support for the use of this task manipulation (low
vs. high probability of no-go targets) as one that modulates
behavioral and self-report indices of MW in dysphoric individ-
uals. Across participants, errors of commission were elevated in
the SART relative to the high probability task, and this effect
was particularly evident in our dysphoric participants. With
respect to subjective indicators, reports of stimulus-independent
thought in the form of TRI and negative MW were elevated
in the SART relative to the high probability task, though this
modulation was not present to a greater extent in our dyspho-
ric sample. Dysphoric participants did, however, report elevated
self-reported MW across retrospective self-report and everyday
dispositional measures of MW. The evidence base is beginning
to converge on the idea that mood and MW can have a recipro-
cal influence on one another, and that interventions like MBCT
may work, at least in part, by training individuals to be present
in the moment. Given this, the application of a method that
can modulate both behavioral and self-report levels of stimulus-
independent thought in the laboratory, not only in healthy par-
ticipants, but also in those experiencing significant depression,
could be useful both theoretically and clinically. At the same time,
it is important to bear in mind that MW can be both constructive
and unconstructive, depending upon the precise circumstances.
Smallwood and Andrews-Hanna (2013) have recently proposed a
framework in which they highlight both task context and thought
content as critical factors that determine the costs and bene-
fits of stimulus-independent thought. An approach along the
lines of that used here might be useful in allowing future inves-
tigators to examine the contributions of context and content
simultaneously.
It is our view that developing a clearer understanding of the
relationship between MW and low mood will ultimately suggest
ways in which clinical interventions can best target MW to help
treat depression and related conditions. Specification of the pre-
cise nature of this relationship could have important implications
for our understanding and delivery of existing clinically-derived
interventions for depression, such as MBCT, as described above,
or Behavioral Activation (BA) (Martell et al., 2013). BA is a
cognitive-behavioral intervention in which individuals must keep
meaningful plans, goals, and activities in mind such that they can
guide and direct subsequent behavior. It is relevant here that MW
has also been shown to be linked to goal maintenance that is, the
ability to maintain behavior in a goal-directed manner (McVay
and Kane, 2009), and that this ability may be compromised in
depression (Dalgleish et al., 2007).
Future studies that address these limitations in a larger and
more clearly specificed sample of depressed and non-depressed
individuals will allow fine-tuning of the present methodology.
The obvious next step would be to investigate how a more reli-
able and effective modulation of MW impacts upon mood state.
This type of approach has been applied previously, by manipulat-
ing the rate of stimulus presentation. Teasdale and Rezin (1978)
demonstrated that a slow, relative to fast, rate of presentation of
information led to an increase in the number of negative thoughts
and lower mood in clinically depressed individuals. Another
avenue for future investigation, on the basis of the present find-
ings, is to explore whether cognitive training that focuses on
increasing the ability to sustain attention could increase control
over everyday MW and benefit mood. An approached based in
the techniques used here has already been translated into clini-
cal practice in brain-injured populations, where the relationship
between performance on the SART and everyday absentmind-
edness has been specified alongside factors that modulate these
(Robertson et al., 1997; Manly et al., 1999). In particular, this
research has provided the basis for an intervention that delivers
periodic “content-free” auditory cues that are intended to remind
patients to refocus on the current task in both laboratory and real
world settings (Manly et al., 2002, 2004; Levine et al., 2011). It is
possible that refinement of the current methodology could lead
to the development of a similar type of intervention in depressed
individuals that could be beneficial in terms of improving low
mood.
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